On Modern Uncertainty
There have been four sorts of ages in the world's history. There have been ages
when everybody thought they knew everything, ages when nobody thought they knew
anything, ages when clever people thought they knew much and stupid people
thought they knew little, and ages when stupid people thought they knew much
and clever people thought they knew little. The first sort of age is one of
stability, the second of slow decay, the third of progress, the fourth of
disaster. All primitive ages belong to the first sort: no one has any doubt as
to the tribal religion, the wisdom of ancient customs, or the magic by which
good crops are to be secured; consequently everyone is happy in the absence of
some tangible reason, such as starvation, for being unhappy.
The second sort of age is exemplified by the ancient world before the rise of
Christianity but after decadence had begun. In the Roman Empire, tribal
religions lost their exclusiveness and force: in proportion as people came to
think that there might be truth in religions of others, they also came to think
that their might be falsehood in their own. Eastern necromancy was half
believed, half disbelieved; the German barbarians were supposed to possess
virtues that the more civilised portions of mankind hand lost. Consequently
everybody doubted everything, and doubt paralysed effort.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, exactly the opposite
happened. Science and scientific technique were a novelty, and gave immense
self-confidence to those who understood them. Their triumphs were obvious and
astonishing. Repeatedly, when the Chinese Emperor had decided to persecute the
Jesuits, they would turn out to be right about the date of an expected eclipse
when the imperial astronomers were wrong, and the Emperor would decide that
such clever men, after all, deserved his favours. In England, those who
introduced scientific methods in agriculture obtained visibly larger crops than
those who adhered to old-time methods, while in manufactures team and machinery
put the conservatives to flight. There came, therefore, to be a general belief
in educated intelligence. Those who did not possess it allowed themselves to be
guided by those who did, and an era of rapid progress resulted.
In our age, the exact opposite is the case. Men of science like Eddington are
doubtful whether science really knows anything. Economists perceive that the
accepted methods of doing the world's business are making everybody poor.
Statesmen cannot find any way of securing international co-operation or
preventing war. Philosophers have no guidance to offer mankind. The only people
left with positive opinions are those who are too stupid to know when their
opinions are absurd. Consequently the world is ruled by fools, and the
intelligent count for nothing in the councils of the nations.
This state of affairs, if it continues, must plunge the world more and more
deeply into misfortune. The scepticism of the intelligent is the cause of their
impotence, and is itself the effect of their laziness: if there is nothing
worth doing, that gives an excuse for sitting still. But when disaster is
impending, no excuse for sitting still can be valid. The intelligent will have
to shed their scepticism, or share responsibility for the evils which all
deplore. And they will have to abandon academic grumblings and peevish
pedantries, for nothing that they amy say will be of any use unless they learn
to speak a language that the democracy can appreciate.